The absence of organized trading in intangibles has been a major hindrance to their recognition as assets in financial reports. Economic circumstances, however, change fast and markets in intangibles, particularly in patents and know-how, are operating both off and on-line (Internet). We examine the most active of these markets--the licensing of patents and knowhow--which has grown exponentially in recent years, focusing on information-relevance and valuation issues.
It is the same line of reasoning, that a cost can be an asset, that leads some people to suggest that the FASB should reconsider FASB statement No. 2 and allow for recognition of research and development costs as an asset. Note that in none of the cases is the asset [proposed to be] represented on the balance sheet exchangeable.
To be sure, the absence of markets, denying intangibles' owners liquidity and investors comparable valuations weakens the case for recognition of these assets in financial statements. 1 Recent developments, however, call for a reconsideration of the intangibles' marketability issue.
A growing number of Internet-based exchanges in technology and know-how have been recently established, providing markets in patents, processes and even non-patented technology.
2 Most of the supply to these markets is provided by large, innovative companies (Sony, Dow Chemicals) which are placing large parts of their patent and know-how portfolios for trade on the websites.
1 Strickly speaking, though, marketability is not an absolute condition for asset recognition: "assets may be acquired without cost, they may be intangible and although not exchangeable they may be usable by the entity in producing or distributing other goods or services." (FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 6, Par. 26 ).
While Internet-based exchanges in intangibles are in infancy, their off-line progenitor--patent licensing--is active and fast-growing. Revenues (royalties) from patent licensing have increased in the U.S. from $15 billion in 1990 to more than $110 billion in 1999 (Rivette and Kline, 2000, p. 59) . Many companies (e.g., IBM, Lucent Technologies, and Dow Chemicals)
established independent divisions dedicated to the licensing of patents and know-how, and various consultants provide specialized services in the valuation of patents and identification of potential licensees. The patents market, both off and on-line is expected to grow fast; a 1998 survey by the technology licensing firm BTG International found that 67% of U.S. companies own technology assets that they fail to exploit in either internal development or licensing (Rivette and Kline, 2000, pp. 58-59) . companies. In semiconductors there has been a significant growth in "fabless" or "chipless" companies, which specialize in the design of chip modules and sell or license the designs to other manufacturing companies (Linden and Somaya 1999) . The licensing market is thus fast increasing in volume and expanding across economic sectors.
Nevertheless, the absence of comparable market prices reduces the reliability of value estimates of nontradable assets.
2 Examples of such Websites are Yet2.com and pl-x.com. On the latter, see Stroud (2000) . 3 IBM is a case in point. While among the top patent holders in the world, its licensing revenues until 1993 amounted to a paltry $30 million a year. This changed drastically when under the newly appointed (1993) CEO Lou Gerstner, IBM embarked on an aggressive licensing program expected to yield $1.4 -1.5 billion in 2000 (Salomon Smith Barney report on IBM, June 22, 1999) . Given the substantially higher gross margin on licensing revenues than on other IBM revenues, the contribution to the bottom line of patent royalties is considerably larger than those of other revenue sources. Thus, while IBM's royalty revenues represent slightly more than 1% of its total revenues, royalty income accounts for 13% of IBM's pretax net income.
We examine in this study various information and valuation issues related to the patent market, where control over patents changes hands through licensing and sale, at least temporarily. 4 Ours is in this sense the first study of a market in intangibles focusing on valuation and financial reporting issues. Our main conclusions are: (a) royalty income is highly valued by investors --a dollar of such income has a market multiple roughly 4 -5 times larger than a dollar of earnings, (b) despite this high valuation, it appears that investors still discount (undervalue) future benefits of licensing-intensive companies, probably because of deficient information concerning innovation and licensing activities, (c) licensing intensity provides investors with an important signal about the "quality" of firms ' R&D, and (d) given the above attributes of licensing income, it is puzzling that there are no specific disclosure requirements concerning intangibles' licensing, causing considerable difficulties and noise in the analysis and valuation of innovative companies.
I. Sample and Data
We obtained our sample by conducting an automated keyword search of "royalty,"
"licensing" and similar terms in firms' annual reports and 10K filings available on NEXIS during the period 1990-1998. A sample of 198 companies was identified as reporting the amount of royalty income from the licensing of technology. 5 The number of firms that disclosed royalty 4 Patent licensing typically extends over 3-5 years. Licensing rates vary across industries, but are typically between 1% and 5% of gross sale of products using the patent. Some companies choose to outsource patent licensing to specialists who typically charge 1/3 of the royalties earned (Rivette and Kline, 2000, p. 62 Summary statistics of the sample are reported in Table 2 . R&D capital is estimated by the procedure in Chan, et al.(1999) , which assumes a uniform 20% annual amortization rate of R&D capital:
R&D capital in year t = R&D Expenditure of year t + 0.8 x R&D Expenditure of year t-1 + 0.6x R&D Expenditure of year t-2 + 0.4x R&D Expenditure of year t-3 + 0.2x R&D Expenditure of year t-4.
Each ratio in Panels A and B of Table 2 is calculated by dividing the sum of the numerators by the sum of the denominators, across all firms with data on royalty income.
The large differences between the mean and median values of the variables in Panel A (e.g., mean total assets $3,420 million; median $47 million) indicate the existence of some very After 1993, Texas Instruments did not report royalty revenues, although it continues to stress that it "expects a significant ongoing stream of royalty revenue into the next century." In 1995, Texas Instruments reported that royalty revenues were record high without disclosing the amount of royalty.
1. IBM, perhaps the largest generator of patent royalties does not disclose this income source in its financial report.
large companies in the sample. The slight decrease in the number of sample firms in 1997 and 1998 (Panel A) suggests, perhaps, an emerging tendency in recent years to refrain from disclosing patent royalty data (see Texas Instruments and IBM cases in footnote 5). The royalty share in net earnings (Panel B) is quite substantial, amounting to about 14%, on average. The correlation matrix in Panel C of Table 2 indicates that royalty income is, as expected, positively related to R&D intensity but negatively related to firm size (total assets).
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How representative is our sample? A relevant benchmark are "other" R&D firms, namely firms engaged in R&D but not reporting royalty revenues. From the comprehensive data on R&D companies in Chan et al. (1999) , we conclude that the sample firms are somewhat more R&D intensive than all R&D firms (R&D-to-sales ratios of 3.40% -3.75% in Chan et al., 1999 , Table 1 vs. average R&D-to-sales ratios of 4%-5% in our sample, Table 2 ). The sample firms are slightly more profitable, on average, than other R&D firms (ROE of sample firms --14% (Table 2) vs. 9% -10% for all R&D firms (Chan et al., 1999 Table IV) ).
Notwithstanding these small differences, the R&D activities of our sample firms share some of the fundamental characteristics of R&D firms in general. For example, Lev and Sougiannis (1996) documented a positive association between firm-specific R&D expenditures and those of the industry. This R&D "spillover" phenomenon, reflecting firms' efforts to learn and benefit from knowledge discovery by other firms, also characterizes our sample. In regressing sample firms' R&D expenditures on the corresponding four-digit industry average R&D, the mean industry R&D coefficient is 0.585 (significant at the 0.0001 level), whereas the mean coefficient in Lev and Sougiannis (1996) ranges from 0.328 to 0.680 across various industry groups. For chemicals and pharmaceutics, the largest concentration of our sample, the mean regression coefficient is 0.445 (significant at the 0.0001 level), compared with 0.458 in Lev and Sougiannis. Furthermore, the market valuation of firms' R&D expenditures in our sample follows a similar pattern to the population of all R&D firms studied in Chan et al. (1999) .
They found that firms with high R&D expenditures relative to equity market value tend to have significantly positive risk-adjusted future returns. This finding was also confirmed in our sample. Taken together, these similarities suggest that our sample is fairly representative of "other" R&D firms.
An important, yet unresolved issue is how representative is our sample of the population of patent licensing enterprises. We know from research (e.g., Arora et al. 2000) and anecdotal evidence that a certain number of large licensors (e.g., IBM, Apple, Sun Microsystems, Eli Lilly)
are absent from our sample due to non-reporting of royalty amounts. Thus, our sample is probably not over-represented with large, successful innovators (a selection bias), yet given the partial reporting of royalty revenues, there is no way we can fully ascertain the representativeness of our sample.
II. The Valuation of Royalty Income
We focus here on investors' valuation of royalty income, using various empirical configurations for the stock price and return regressions. Panel A of Table 3 reports estimates from a conventional cross-sectional pooled regression of annual stock returns on reported earnings (level and changes) and royalty income. The returns are cumulated from the fourth month of the fiscal year through the third month of the following year, to reflect publication of the information in the annual report (disclosed during the three months after fiscal year-end).
Several findings stand out. First, the coefficients of royalty income in all the regression configurations are highly statistically significant, and more importantly --they are very large compared to the coefficients of earnings. Thus, for example, in the bottom regression, the coefficient of royalty income (3.142) is over five times larger than the combined coefficients of the earnings level and change (0.476 + 0.124). Second, separating royalty income from earnings increases considerably R 2 (compare, for example, line 1 with 6 in Table 3 (Panel A)), indicating the value-relevance to investors of the royalty information. We will return to this issue in the policy discussion (Section IV).
The regression estimates reported in Panel A (Table 3) are pooled over time, raising the issue of independence of observations. In panel B of Table 3 we report regression estimates for individual years to alley the pooling concern. It is evident that in all eight individual years the coefficient of royalty income is positive, and statistically significant in the majority of years.
Our conclusions about the value-relevance to investors of royalty income, accordingly, hold for the unpooled data as well. We use analyst earnings forecasts provided by I/B/E/S to estimate future abnormal earnings. Specifically, earnings for years t+1, t+2, and t+3 are measured as the first median consensus earnings forecasts in the month immediately following the disclosure of actual earnings for year t. Earnings for years t+4, t+5 are estimated using analyst forecast of long-term growth rate. For firms that do not have earnings forecast for year t+3, we use the forecast of long-term growth rate to estimate earnings for year t+3. Future book values are estimated using the clean surplus relation (CSR), based on the firm's most recent dividend payout ratio. Stock price is as of the end of the month following the announcement of earnings of the prior year. All independent variables are deflated by the number of shares outstanding at the end of the prior fiscal year. In estimating the residual earnings model, we include royalty income as an additional explanatory variable for stock prices. If royalty income contains information that is incremental to the current book value and the present value of future abnormal earnings (PVFAE), the coefficient on royalty income is expected to be positive and significant.
Indeed, the coefficient estimates of royalty income reported in Table 5 are in line with those of the preceding regressions--statistically significant and very large in magnitude. Our estimates of the value-relevance of royalty income thus appear to be robust to the specific estimation model used.
Summarizing, the "bang for the buck" of patent royalty income is statistically significant and substantially larger, on average, than that of other income sources. The probable reason is that royalty income is perceived to be of higher "quality," that is more persistent, than most other income sources. Patent licensing is generally of a medium to long-term duration, leading to the relative persistence (stability) of royalty income. Patent licensing provides additional important benefits, such as protection of inventors' intellectual property by curbing patent infringement, and sometimes speeding up the establishment of a firm's technology as the industry standard (e.g., CDMA technology licensed by Qualcomm).
III. Enhancing the Reliability of R&D Valuation
Few would question the fact that R&D expenditures are, on average, associated with significant future benefits (increased revenues, cost savings, etc.). However, it is widely believed that R&D expenditures are more risky than, say, expenditures on physical assets (e.g.,
property, plant & equipment), raising concerns with the reliability of R&D assets, if such assets were to be recognized in financial report. 7 While a comprehensive treatment of the reliability of intangibles' values is obviously beyond the confines of this study, we wish to examine the following related, yet more focused valuation question: Do royalty revenues contribute to investors' ability to value R&D expenditures (i.e., increasing the reliability of R&D valuations)?
It stands to reason that firms that successfully commercialize (license) their patents (i.e., royaltyintensive companies) have, on average, more valuable and promising R&D than firms without patent royalties. Accordingly, in assessing the profit potential of R&D expenditures (reliability of R&D capital), investors can be expected to consider favorably the ability of the firm to enhance royalty income. We, accordingly, hypothesize that R&D valuation by investors should increase with the intensity of patent royalties.
This hypothesis is indeed confirmed by the estimates reported in Table 6 . Regressing annual returns on earnings before R&D expense and the R&D expense (both independent variables scaled by beginning year market value) over the entire sample (top row in Table 6 ), yields a coefficient estimate for R&D of 2.071 (p-value = 0.0001). However, when the R&D is interacted with a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the firm is in the top quartile of the ranking of sample firms by royalty intensity (royalty income over sales), the interaction coefficient is statistically significant (middle row in Table 6 ) and its value--2.825 (1.054+1 .771) is substantially larger than the average valuation of R&D--2.071. When the interaction is with the top quintile of the royalty intensity ranking (bottom row of Table 6 ), investors' valuation of a dollar R&D is even higher--3.169 (1.463+1.706).
We conclude that the intensity of royalty income provides investors with a valuable signal regarding the quality of R&D, which is needed to assess the economic potential of the highly uncertain R&D expenditures. The contemporaneous analysis presented in the preceding sections demonstrated that investors place a high valuation (relative to earnings and book value) on royalty income. This, however, does not necessarily indicate that investors fully appreciate the future implications of royalty income. Contemporaneous association indicates only that the examined information (royalty income in our case) is consistent with the information set used by investors. Such association does not preclude, however, the possibility that investors do not fully appreciate the implications of the information, namely the existence of systematic over or under-reaction to the information.
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Examination of the extent to which investors fully appreciate the implications of royalty income is important, given the deficiencies in the disclosure of this information: The underlying fundamentals (e.g., duration of licensing contracts) are not shared with investors, nor is the firm's inventory of licensable patents known to investors, and there is not even a requirement to disclose royalty income as a separate line item in the financial report. Evidence on systematic mispricing of such a deficiently disclosed, yet highly relevant item may suggest to standardsetters the need for improved disclosure.
Systematic mispricing of specific types of securities is generally analyzed in the finance literature by forming portfolios on the basis of certain public information or company attribute (e.g., the book-to-market ratio, see Lakonishok et al., 1994) , followed by an examination of the pattern of risk-adjusted portfolio returns subsequent to portfolio formation. If the securities in the examined portfolios were properly priced upon formation, the subsequent risk-adjusted returns should average to zero (no systematic drifts). However, if the examined securities were systematically underpriced (overpriced) when the portfolios were formed, and if investors over time recognize the mispricing, and correct for it, then the subsequent risk-adjusted returns should be positive (negative) over a certain time period, as a result of investors bidding up (down) the prices of the mispriced securities (see Lakonishok et al. 1994 for such a test).
A crucial issue in such mispricing tests is the proper adjustment for risk, since systematic patterns in subsequent portfolio returns may just indicate a compensation for risk rather than securities' mispricing. The most commonly used methodology for risk-adjusting returns is the factor model (Fama and French 1993 and 1996 , Jagadesch and Titman 1993 , where the risk factors used to adjust returns are: market risk (beta value), firm size, the book-to-market ratio and the recent return momentum. These four factors were found in extensive finance research to systematically affect stock returns. We, accordingly, have used this four-factor model to risk adjust returns of portfolios ranked by intensity of royalty income (royalty income to sales).
Specifically, we calculate risk-adjusted returns for three portfolios constructed from the The focus of analysis is on the intercepts of these regressions which indicate systematic abnormal (risk-adjusted) returns.
10 About 1/3 of the sample companies do not have a December 31 fiscal year. When we perform this portfolio analysis for the December 31 firms only, we get essentially the same results as those reported below. 11 For example, for the high royalty intensity companies (top 1/3 of the royalty raking) in 1990, there are 12 monthly returns for the first year after portfolio formation (April 1991 through March 1992). For these top royalty income companies, there are also 12 monthly returns for the second year post 1990 (April 1992 through March 1993), and 12 returns for the third year (April 1993 -March 1994 . There are, thus, 60 monthly returns for the first year following the five years 1990-1994. There are similarly 60 monthly returns for the second year following portfolio formations, and 60 returns for the third year. Each of those 60 monthly returns series are then regressed over the four risk factors corresponding to those months (for a detailed description of this procedure, see Carhart, 1997) .
Estimates of the four-factor model regressions are reported in Table 7 . The coefficient estimates of the intercept (left two numerical columns) indicate that in each of the three years following portfolio formation (the three panels of the table) the intercept coefficients are statistically insignificant for portfolios 1 and 2 (with the exception of portfolio 1 in the third year), suggesting that the shares of companies with low to medium royalty intensity tend to be properly priced, on average. On the other hand, the intercepts of the third portfolio, consisting of firms with high royalty income to sales, are all positive and statistically significant (t-values > 2).
This evidence is consistent with a systematic undervaluation of firms intensive in royalty income.
12 Such an undervaluation may be due to investors discounting the full potential of future royalty revenues, given inadequate information about licensing agreements, patents slated for licensing and innovative activities, in general.
V. Discussion
The absence of organized trading in intangibles has been a major hindrance to their recognition as assets in financial reports, despite the fast increase in the volume and economic importance of intangible capital. 13 However, economic circumstances concerning markets in intangibles are changing rapidly, particularly with respect to patents and know-how. A steep increase in the volume of patent licensing and sale in recent years and the establishment of 12 Given our incomplete knowledge of risk, the evidence in Table 6 may also be consistent with the existence of a systematic risk factor related to patent royalties or R&D intensity which is not captured by the four-factors used in the regressions. This possibility of an unknown risk factor accounting for systematic return behavior haunts every finance/accounting research on mispricing in securities markets. 13 John Kendrick (1994), for example, estimates that intangible capital contributed in the 1990s about 70% of the growth of the U.S. economy, compared with 30% contribution of tangible capital.
Internet-based exchanges in intellectual capital warrant, in our opinion, a reconsideration of the marketability of intangibles issue and its implications for the accounting and financial reporting of intangibles.
In the context of such a reconsideration, we report in this study the results of an examination of information and valuation issues related to patent licensing. Our main findings are: (a) there is considerable nonuniformity in the disclosure of royalty income (e.g., some firms, such as IBM and Texas Instruments, known to derive hundreds of millions of dollars annually from patent licensing are not disclosing this item), (b) royalty income is highly valued by investors, both in its own right and as a validator of the value and potential of R&D, and (c) royalty-intensive companies exhibit systematic upward drifts in subsequent risk-adjusted returns, a finding consistent with either underpricing or a specific systematic risk factor associated with patent licensing.
This evidence has important implications for managers, investors and accounting standard-setters. For the former, evidence on the high valuation of royalty income indicates the importance of managing the patent portfolio in order to maximize income through internal development of discoveries as well as from licensing and sale of patents and know-how. This is currently a "hot topic" in the management of knowledge area. 14 For investors and financial analysts, our findings suggest the need for special attention in the valuation of knowledge-based business enterprises to the potential of patent utilization, both in internal product development as well as in the generation of licensing revenues. There is indeed, a growing awareness in the investment community of the importance of patents as value-drivers (e.g., Deng et al. 1999 ).
14 See, for example, Rivette and Kline, 2000a.
Our findings should draw the attention of accounting standard-setters to the R&D/patents area. At a minimum, given the fast increase in the volume of patent licensing and our evidence of the value-relevance of this income source, the licensing-related disclosure requirements should be improved. A specific (line item) disclosure of patent royalties along with information about the duration and amounts of future royalties (similar to the footnote disclosure currently required for operating leases) seems, in our opinion, warranted. More far-reaching, the emergence of markets in intangibles, particularly the Internet-based ones, call in our opinion for a close watch by regulators of the implications of such markets for the recognition as assets of certain traded intangibles. a All ratios in Panels A and B are given by the sum of the corresponding numerator divided by the sum of the corresponding denominator, across all firms with data of royalty income.
b Following Chan et al. (1999) , R&D capital of year t is estimated as: Σ j = 0 to 4 R&D Expenditure t -j x (1 -0.2 x j). 
Regression results are based on 665 firm-years. All independent variables are deflated by the market value at the beginning of the fiscal year. a Probability levels are in parenthesis below the coefficient estimate.
b The Z 1 and Z 2 statistics are calculated as:
where t j is the t -statistic for year j , k j is degrees of freedom, and T is number of years. market value at the beginning of the fiscal year. R i t is the firm's annual stock return, cumulated from nine months before fiscal t year-end through three months after it, X i t is reported net income of year t, ∆ X i t is the annual change in net income, and Royalty i t is royalty and/or licensing income of year t. For regressions of "Earnings Exclude Royalty", X i t is equal to reported earnings minus roylaty/licensing income and ∆ X i t is adjusted accordingly. 
Regression results are based on 771 firm-years. All independent variables are deflated by the number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. P i t is the stock price three months after fiscal year-end. BV i t is the book value per share, X i t is earnings per share, and Royalty i t is royalty/licensing income per share. In the regression of "Earnings Exclude Royalty", X i t is equal to reported earnings minus roylaty/licensing income, divided by the number of shares oustanding at the end of the fiscal year. Probability levels are in parenthesis below the coefficient estimate. Regression results are based on 324 firm-years. All independent variables are deflated by the number of shares outstanding at the end of fiscal year. P i t is stock price as of the end of the month immediately following the reporting of annual earnings of year t. BV i t is the book value of equity of year t. PVFAE i t is the present value of future abnormal earnings. Future abnormal earnings of year t + i is equal to median earnings forecast of year t + i minus the discount rate times book value of year t + i, and book value of year t + i is calculated using the clean surplus relation, by assuming future dividend payout ratio will be the same as the current one. For firms with negative earnings, dividend payout ratio is estimated by dividing dividends by 6 percent of total assets. Earnings forecast for years t+1, t+2, and t+3 is measured as the first median consensus earnings estimates for the month immediately after actual earnings for year t are reported. Earnings forecast for years t+4 and t+5 is based on analysts' estimates of long-term growth rate. Regression results are based on 732 firm-years. All independent variables are deflated by the market value at the beginning of the fiscal year.
R i t is the firm's annual stock return, cumulated from nine months before fiscal year-end through three months after it, X A i t is net income of year t, before the expensing of R&D expenditure, RDEXP i t is the R&D expenditure of year t, and Royalty_Dum i t is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if an observation is in top quartile or top quintile of royalty income to sales ratio, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. The results are based on monthly stock returns of three equally-sized portfolios that are formed at the end of April each year from 1990 to 1994, based on the rank of royalty income relative to sales (from low to high). Equally-weighted monthly buy-and-hold portfolio returns are then calculated over each of the three years following portfolio formation. The monthly portfolio returns are regressed on the monthly value of four factors that are found in prior literature to be systematically associated with stock return, for each portfolio and for each of the three years after portfolio formation. Specifically, these factors are market risk, firm size, book-to-market ratio, and recent return momentum.
R p t -R f t is the monthly return on the portfolio in excess of the Treasury bill rate in month t, R m t -R f t is the excess return on the value-weighted market index, RSIZE t and RBM t are the returns on the Fama-French (1993) factor-mimicking portfolios for size and book-to-market respectively, and RMT t is the one year momentum in stock returns, measured as the difference between the equally-weighted average returns of firms with the highest 30% eleven-month returns lagged on month, and the average return of firms with the lowest 30% eleven-month returns lagged one month. The return period is from 9 months before fiscal year-end to 3 months after fiscal year-end. Price is as of three months after fiscal year-end. The return period is from nine months before the fiscal year-end to three months after it. ROY_DUM is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if an observation is in top quartile or quintile of royalty income to sales ratio, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. The independent variables are deflated by market value at the beginning of the fiscal year. Earnings before R&D expensing" are equal to reported earnings plus R&D expenditure. The procedure of adjusting EPS for the capitalization and amortization of R&D follows Lev and Sougiannis (1996) , and the amount of capitalized and amortized R&D is estimated following Chan et al. (1999) .
